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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy Research Working Paper 5977
This paper analyzes the trends and evolution of public 
spending in the agriculture sector in Indonesia, as well 
as the impact of public spending on agricultural growth. 
It finds that, in line with empirical work undertaken 
in other countries, public spending on agriculture and 
irrigation during the period 1976–2006 had a positive 
impact on agricultural growth, while public spending 
on fertilizer subsidies had the opposite effect. The 
composition of spending patterns in Indonesia over the 
past decade can partly explain why significant increases 
in public spending for agriculture have not resulted in a 
commensurate increase of agricultural production. The 
paper is structured as follows. Section I presents analytical 
and empirical findings about the impact of overall 
public spending on growth, with a particular focus on 
Indonesia, followed by an analysis of the government’s 
This paper is a product of the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, East Asia Region. It is part of a larger 
effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions 
around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author 
may be contacted at eblancoarmas@worldbank.org.  
role in agriculture. More precisely, it discusses how public 
spending can contribute to higher productivity and faster 
growth in the sector. The section draws lessons from the 
empirical literature and country examples worldwide, 
exploring the implications of some of these findings in 
the Indonesia context. Section II presents the results of 
an empirical analysis of the impact of agriculture public 
spending on agriculture gross domestic product per 
capita growth in Indonesia, using time series analysis with 
both ordinary least squares and generalized method of 
moments econometric techniques. Section III analyzes 
in detail agriculture public spending trends in Indonesia 
over the period 2000–08, highlighting that a large and 
increasing share of the spending is being allocated to 
subsidies (fertilizer, credit, seeds) and to fund transfers to 
farmers and farmers’ groups.  
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I.  Can Public Spending Affect Agricultural Development?  The Case of Indonesia 
What Do We Know about the Impact of Public Spending on Growth? 
While the empirical literature on the direction and magnitude of the impact of public spending 
on growth is mixed, there is growing evidence that, at the macroeconomic and microeconomic 
levels, public expenditure can impact development.
1 Public investment focused on areas where 
there are market failures and public good externalities have a highly positive rate of return and 
yield benefits that substantially outweigh the costs. In contrast, poorly -implemented efforts in 
activities that are better suited to private activities can be counter-productive.  
In the literature on growth, several empirical studies have focused on both the traditional and 
new channels through which different types of public spending can affect growth.
2 A direct 
effect relates to an increase in the economy’s capital stock (physical or human) reflecting higher 
flows of public funds, especially when they are complementary to those privately financed. 
Public  investment  can  also  contribute  to  growth  indirectly  by  increasing  the  marginal 
productivity of both publicly and privately supplied production factors.  For example, public 
expenditure on agriculture research and development (R&D) can promote higher productivity by 
improving  the  interaction  between  physical  and  human  capital  production  inputs.  Other 
components of public spending, related for instance to the enforcement of land property rights, 
can also exert a positive indirect effect on growth by contributing to better use of existing 
assets. There is also growing evidence suggesting that, in developing countries, externalities 
associated with infrastructure public spending may be more important than commonly thought 
by having a sizable impact on human capital as well.
3   
There are limits to the positive impact that public spending may have on growth. Regarding the 
total level of public spending, an implicit common result in recent empirical studies seems to 
support an inverse U -shaped relationship theory,
4 according to which public spending may 
affect growth positively (after controlling for the negative effects associated with its financing) 
up to a certain point, above which additional spending may lead to negative growth as the 
needs for additional (and likely distortionary) financing increase. This caveat on the limits to 
government intervention should inform policy a nalysis regarding the likely impact of public 
spending on growth, as increasing the size of the budget beyond a certain threshold may be 
associated with efficiency losses.
5 
                                                 
1 There is much debate about the drivers of the so-called  “East Asia Miracle”, but it is becoming clearer that rising 
human  capital  due  to  improvements  in  primary  and  secondary  education  made  an  important  contribution. 
Vandenbenbussche, Aghion and Meghir (2005) conclude that there is a link between human capital accumulation, or 
education attainment, and growth 
2 See Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2003), Zagler and Durnecker (2003), and Agénor (2004) for overviews of this literature, 
and Agénor and Moreno-Dodson (2007) for a particular focus on public spending on infrastructure .  Noteworthy 
empirical studies include Devarajan, Swaroop, and Zou, 199 3; Tanzi and Zee, 1997;  Bleaney, Gemmel, and Kneller, 
2001; and Bose, Haque, and Osborn, 2007. 
3 As discussed by Agénor and Moreno-Dodson (2007), public infrastructure affects growth not only through its direct 
impact on investment and productivity, but also through health and education outcomes. 
4 As suggested by Barro (1998), Tanzi (1997), and others. 
5 For a sample of  developed countries, Folster and Henrekson (2001) conclude that there is a negative relationship 
between government expenditures and growth in the EU.  Similarly, Afonso and Furceri (2008) find that total public     3 
Both  the  composition  as  well  as  the  level  of  spending  matter  for  growth.  Regarding  the 
composition  of  public  spending,  some  items  can  trigger  a  complementary  effect  by  either 
stimulating private spending or providing additional counterpart funding for growing private 
sector investments, such as safe roads, and reliable communications and energy supply.  On the 
contrary,  some  other  budget  items  can  crowd  out  private  spending,  either  by  reducing 
incentives for private investors entering in a particular market or sector, or by triggering higher 
public  deficits  and  accumulated  public  debt  in  need  of  financing,  which  reduces  the  credit 
available for the private sector and, in the long run, leads to higher interest rates.   
Several  empirical  studies
6  find that, whilst controlling formally for the government budget 
constraint, under certain fiscal policy conditions (for example, fiscal stability and a relatively 
small government budget size), at least some categories of public expenditures do exhibit 
positive growth effects.
7 In particular some authors (Gemmel, 2007; Moreno -Dodson, 2008), 
provide empirical support for the view that in a developing country context, “productive” public 
expenditure triggers a growth-enhancing effect.
8   
Comparing Indonesia with Other Fast-Growing Countries 
A recent empirical study (Moreno-Dodson, 2008) that includes Indonesia together with six other 
fast-growing countries (South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Botswana, and Mauritius) 
finds an empirically robust relationship between public spending and GDP per capita growth for 
the period 1970-2006. Furthermore, medium-term and dynamic effects of public spending on 
growth  are  identified  for  some  categories  of  spending,  such  as  education,  and  economic 
spending (both in the short and medium term), and “productive” spending (with a dynamic 
effect)
9. The study also highlights the importance of maintaining macroeconomic stability to 
ensure the positive contribution of public spending to growth. 
In this study, Indonesia was identified as the only country in the sample in which the results of 
the overall impact were inconclusive.
10 Several preliminary explanations could be advanced. 
First, it is a relationship difficult to quantify because the budget deviations  —those differences 
between  the  planned  and  executed  budgets  —  can  account  for  finding  a  weaker  and/or 
distorted impact in the data. Second, although political economy variables were not introduced 
in the analysis, all countries in the selected sample, with the exception of Indonesia, rank quite 
                                                                                                                                                 
expenditures seem to impinge negatively on the real growth of per capita GDP, indicating that government size is 
likely to be detrimental to economic growth. See also Pushak, Tiongson, and Varoudakis, 2007. 
6 See Haque and Kim (2003), Bose et al. (2007), Adam and Bevan (2006), and Moreno-Dodson (2008). 
7 In addition, there is growing evidence that there is a higher growth pay-off from macroeconomic stability and public 
spending in countries characterized by relatively better public sector governance. 
8  This categorization was introduced by Bleany , Gammel, and Kneller in 2001.  A  priori  the  public  expenditure 
categories that are expected to have a positive joint impact on growth are called “productive” expenditures and 
include  spending  in  general  public  services,  defense,  education,  health,  housing,  and  transportation  and 
communication.   
9 See Moreno-Dodson, 2008, for further clarification on the different definitions of public spending used in this 
section. 
10 The analysis was conducted including both central and sub-national government public spending in Indonesia, and 
the results were similar.  The findings of this exercise, however, need to be interpreted with caution as no further 
country analysis of the Indonesia case has been so far undertaken.     4 
favorably in terms of government effectiveness
11 when compared with the rest of the world.  
Indonesia, having made significant governance improvements over the past decade, still ranks 
lowest in the sample on both government effectiveness and corruption control in 2006. Finally, 
it is possible to envisage that the composition of public spending in Indonesia has not evolved 
according to development priorities or to the fast growth track that the country experienced in 
the previous four decades.  In t his case, restructuring public spending in favor of the most 
“productive” categories driving growth, while releasing funds from other activities where the 
private sector is capable and willing to invest more effectively, could be highly beneficial for 
Indonesia. 
Role of the Public Sector in Agriculture Development 
The role of the public sector in agricultural development, primarily a private activity, is to set 
the enabling environment in which private sector activities can flourish, correcting for instances 
under which the market fails to allocate resources efficiently, and minimizing price distortions 
faced  by  both  farmers  and  consumers,  while  promoting  inclusive  growth.  In  practice,  this 
translates into interventions along several dimensions:  
i)  Correcting for externalities, which requires making people pay (or be paid) for the 
cost and benefits of their actions, such as discouraging fertilizer over-use leading to 
pollution, or rewarding advances in R&D with a patent;  
ii)  Providing for public goods that are not efficiently and sufficiently produced by the 
market (e.g. building rural roads and irrigation systems, providing extension services 
and agriculture marketing, and funding more agriculture R&D);  
iii)  Addressing information asymmetries, eliminating information  gaps so that farmers 
and consumers can make informed decisions on what to produce, with what level of 
inputs, and at what price (for example certifying product input and output quality 
standards, ensuring plant and animal health) ; and  
iv)  Regulating against monopolistic behavior that reduces social welfare by, for example, 
having lower outputs sold at higher prices. 
Why Is the Provision of Public Goods Important for Agriculture? 
According to the theory of public economics, only the public sector can supply public goods 
efficiently (and at adequate amounts) as the market will always under-provide them. When 
supplied in a cost-effective way, public goods will generate higher returns than investments in 
private  inputs  because  they  will  create  positive  externalities  for  the  economy  as  a  whole. 
Because  governments  have  the  capacity  to  collect  individual  contributions,  can  capture 
economies of scale, access funding, and manage risk better than farmers, they are better suited 
to supply public goods.  
On the other hand, the impact from subsidizing private inputs on productivity is unclear. As the 
literature review included in this paper will show, the record of governments subsidizing private 
inputs is, at best, mixed, although a large number of governments spend a considerable share of 
                                                 
11 According to the World Bank KKM indicators, government effectiveness measures the quality of public services, the 
quality of the civil service, the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation 
and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies.     5 
their budget doing so. The impact of subsidizing private inputs at the expense of the provision of 
public goods on productivity is often negative, as will be discussed and shown in this paper. 
Subsidizing private inputs often represents only a transfer of resources with no impact on the 
consumption of that input, and even if the subsidy increases its use, its impact on productivity is 
unclear (e.g. there are diminishing returns on fertilizer usage, so that beyond a point additional 
use of fertilizer may not have any impact, or a negative one, on production).  
Impact of Public Spending on Growth in the Agriculture Sector 
There is renewed interest in improving the understanding of governments of the impact of 
public spending on agricultural growth. Evidence provided by a research project from FAO in 20 
countries in Latin America shows that public spending in rural areas has a positive impact on 
agricultural growth (Alcott et al, 2006). The study also shows that both the volume and the 
composition of spending matter. Assuming a fixed amount of spending in the agricultural sector, 
a high share of spending on subsidies to private inputs has a negative impact on agricultural 
growth given the corresponding lower spending on the provision of public goods. Lopez and 
Galinato (2007) find similar results and argue that the positive impact of public spending on 
rural incomes is primarily dependent on the composition of spending. They estimate that a 10 
percent reallocation from subsidizing private goods to providing public goods can increase per 
capita agricultural income by 5 percent. In a related piece of work by Santos and Ortega (2006), 
the authors show how the share of the budget allocated to subsidizing private inputs has a 
negative and significant impact on the efficiency of public spending. All these studies emphasize 
the concept of opportunity costs of subsidies. Although increased usage of a particular input may 
have  a  positive  impact  on  production  (e.g.  fertilizer  on  rice  production),  the  impact  of 
subsidizing such inputs is often negative because it is done at the expense of providing public 
goods (e.g. research on newer varieties or improvements to the irrigation network) with a larger 
positive impact on production. 
In Indonesia, Fuglie (2004) identifies the drivers of growth in agriculture from the 1960s until 
2000.  He argues that while in the 1970s and 1980s agricultural productivity was increasing, this 
trend has been flat since the early 1990s with most growth in agriculture being explained by 
increases  in  production  inputs  (labor,  land).    (Annex  IV  illustrates  the  paths  of  agricultural 
growth  and  yields  growth  for  several  commodities  in  Indonesia  over  this  period.)  Fuglie 
furthermore argues that the reason behind the stagnation in agricultural productivity from the 
1990s onwards is the low levels of both private and public investments, with public investments 
in R&D, rural infrastructure and irrigation being necessary complements to private investments 
in agriculture. 
In the following sections we review the type of government spending that can have a positive 
impact on agricultural growth. We use primarily evidence collected in other countries, but, to 
the extent possible, we also include information available for Indonesia in our review. The areas 
discussed below are not necessarily an exhaustive list of factors determining agricultural growth. 
We are primarily concerned with the provision of public goods and services with high fiscal 
implications,  and  other  public  spending  categories  that  are  not  necessarily  providing  public 
goods (primarily the provision of subsidies to private inputs such as seeds, fertilizer or credit) 
but also affect the volume and composition of the budget. Public policies in the areas of trade or 
business environment are also crucial for agricultural development, but public intervention in     6 
these areas usually has lower spending implications and will therefore be excluded from this 
paper.  
Irrigation 
Irrigation has been key to increasing productivity in agriculture in many developing countries 
and investments in the irrigation network are credited with much of the productivity growth 
achieved  in  Indonesia  and  other  Asian  countries  in  the  1970s  and  1980s.  The  World 
Development Report 2008 estimates that returns for investments in irrigation systems are on 
average  15-20  percent  around  the  world.    Furthermore,  there  are  economies  of  scale  in 
irrigation projects, where the rates of return to large projects have been higher than those of 
small-scale  investments  (World  Bank,  2008).  Therefore,  due  to  the  cost  structure  of 
infrastructure  projects  (very  high  fixed  costs  and  risks)  and  its  quasi-public  good  character, 
authorities are better equipped to invest in irrigation systems. They have access to cheaper 
funding, can handle risk better than small farmer groups, and can overcome the externality 
problems that may prevent private individuals/ farmers from investing in irrigation.  
In  Indonesia,  the  focus  of  earlier  decades  on  central  government  development  of  water 
resources  and  infrastructure  contributed  to  food  security,  rural  poverty  reduction,  and 
economic growth.  Indonesia's agriculture sector is dominated by rice cultivation, of which 82 
percent is grown under irrigation. By the 1990s, however, the focus on irrigation area expansion 
was  neglecting  maintenance  of  the  existing  infrastructure,  compounded  by  the  lack  of 
mechanisms  for  cost  recovery,  and  inadequate  local  engagement  in  management.    The 
persistent under-funding of irrigation system maintenance led to one third of the 3 million 
hectares of government-designed irrigation schemes being rehabilitated at least twice in the 
past 25 years (ADB/IFPRI, 2003). Recent improvements in the management of irrigation systems 
through  water  users’  associations  and  their  federations  are  partly  being  credited  for  the 
increase  in  rice  production  in  2007  and  2008.  Although  the  increased  participation  of 
communities and water associations in the management of the irrigation systems has improved 
the maintenance of the existing irrigation network at the local level, it is still unlikely to lead to 
the large-scale investments in irrigation that may be needed and should be undertaken by the 
public sector. 
Agriculture Research & Development  
Agriculture productivity improvements have been closely linked to investments in agricultural 
R&D  in  both  developed  and  developing  countries.  The  empirical  evidence  that  R&D  for 
agriculture yields high returns is prominent and suggests it is close to 50 percent in Asia (World 
Bank,  2008).    Thus,  Alston  et  al  (2000)  found  that  on  average  returns  to  investments  in 
agricultural  R&D  are  around  43%,  after  examining  700  projects  in  both  developed  and 
developing  countries,  while  Salmon  (1991)  estimated  that  the  return  to  R&D  for  rice  in 
Indonesia was 151 percent using data for 1967-77. Furthermore, research conducted by IFPRI 
found  that  the  poverty  reduction  effect  per  unit  of  additional  agricultural  R&D  investment 
ranked second only to investment in rural education. Finally, Fan and Pardey (1997) found that 
investment  in  extension  services  in  China  accounted  for  almost  20  percent  of  the  overall 
agriculture growth from 1965 to 1993.       7 
Increasing public funding for R&D will be necessary for developing countries to adapt and tap 
into new knowledge to maintain competitiveness in their agriculture sectors.  This requires 
removing  barriers  to  private  R&D  investments,  promoting  public-private  partnerships,  and 
integrating farmer organizations into technological innovations. In many countries, however, 
agricultural policies distort prices in ways that eliminate the incentives and opportunities for 
farmers to adopt these new technologies. Also, barriers to technology diffusion and intellectual 
property protection act as constraints and prevent the spillover of technology. Hence, countries 
need to promote ways to better tap into global technological potentials and even expand their 
own efforts upstream to more relevant areas if they seek to boost their agriculture productivity 
(IFPRI, 2006).
  
Indonesia currently ranks near the bottom of Asian countries in R&D public spending, relative to 
agriculture GDP and to total government spending on agriculture. Public spending on R&D as a 
share of agricultural GDP was 0.22 percent in 2003, similar to Vietnam (0.17 percent) and Laos 
(0.24 percent), but much lower than in neighboring Malaysia (1.92 percent) and the Philippines 
(0.46 percent). The 2002 ratio for Indonesia was roughly half the average for Asia (0.41 percent) 
and the developing world as a whole (0.53 percent) that year. It has also been pointed out that 
the  highly  fragmented  current  efforts,  weak  linkages  to  international  providers,  limited 
involvement of universities, and weak intellectual property rights for agricultural technologies 
all affect negatively the impact that R&D public spending could have on agriculture TFP (IFPRI, 
2006). 
Extension Services 
Agriculture extension services are instrumental in providing human capital-enhancing inputs, as 
well as flows of information to farmers.  Given their public good attributes, most extension 
services worldwide are publicly-funded and delivered by civil servants. Attempts to privatize 
them have not been very successful worldwide mainly because farmers seem to be unwilling to 
pay for agricultural extension services on a continuous basis unless those services are integrated 
with the sale of inputs or other technical/marketing services (World Bank, 2006b).  
Although  the  record  of  agriculture  extension  services  is  rather  mixed,  they  can  reduce  the 
differential  between  potential  and  actual  yields.    They  are  a  way  to  accelerate  technology 
transfer and help farmers become better managers, but the impact is dependent on the delivery 
format  and  circumstances  under  which  the  recipients  operate  (Anderson  and  Feder,  2003). 
Recent work reviewing returns to R&D and extension services across a number of countries, 
found yearly rates of return of almost 60 percent for extension investments (Alston et al, 2000).  
Along these lines, research at IFPRI demonstrated that receiving at least one extension visit in 
Ethiopia  reduced  smallholders’  likelihood  of  being  poor  by  10  percent  and  increased 
consumption growth by 7 percent (IFPRI, 2008).  However, the literature also provides evidence 
of high variability in the returns to investment, highlighting the importance of good program 
design and implementation. 
As in other countries, there is room for improving Indonesia’s extension system, making it more 
cost efficient and effective.  Worldwide trends indicate that national extension systems should 
shift their efforts towards organizing farmers into groups, and then focusing those groups on 
higher-value commodities and products.  In addition, many examples of extension programs 
designed with a gender focus, which attempt to reduce the greater constraints faced by women,     8 
can contribute to improve overall effectiveness. Decentralized service delivery and incentives 
structures that rely primarily on private provision (not funding) have also been identified as 
success factors behind extension services in many countries. 
Infrastructure/Rural Roads 
Inadequate  rural  infrastructure  weakens  the  links  between  farmers  to  local,  regional,  and 
international markets, escalating marketing costs, and undermining productivity. As numerous 
examples worldwide have demonstrated, investing in rehabilitation and maintenance of rural 
roads can have a direct impact on the variety of goods sold in the market (Vietnam), increasing 
opportunities for off-farm female employment (Georgia), as well as reducing considerably travel 
time  which  has  direct  impact  on  agriculture  productivity  (Madagascar)  (World  Bank,  2008). 
Zhang and Fan (2001) find a positive and significant impact of infrastructure (measured by road 
density) on agricultural productivity in India. Finan et al (2002) in Kjoellerstroem (2006) find that 
the income of households with easy access to rural roads is twice to three times the income of 
households without access to rural roads in poor rural communities in Mexico. 
Indonesia achieved remarkable results in improving access to infrastructure in rural areas until 
investments came to a halt during the financial crisis in 1997/98.  Only now has Indonesia 
resumed investments at levels similar to those prior to that financial crisis. But development of 
infrastructure has been uneven, with areas outside Java and Bali lagging behind. As a result, the 
poor condition of roads and high transportation costs have been identified by firms in rural 
areas as a key constraint for growth (World Bank, 2006a). A common problem with rural roads 
and  infrastructure  is  the  neglect  of  operation  and  maintenance,  leading  to  expensive 
rehabilitation. Around four-fifths of the total national road network falls under the responsibility 
of  sub-national  governments,  which  now  account  for  almost  two-thirds  of  all  development 
spending on roads. There is evidence that provincial and district authorities are under-spending 
in the operation and maintenance of infrastructure (World Bank, 2007). 
Subsidies to Private Inputs 
There are instances where governments can use subsidies to address failures in agricultural 
markets,  despite  agriculture  being  primarily  a  private  sector  activity.  Imperfect  information 
and/or  high  transaction  costs  can  lead  to  market  failures.  Financial  constraints  are  more 
pervasive in agriculture. There are higher transaction costs and risks because of: (i) greater 
spatial  dispersion  of  production,  (ii)  lower  population  densities,  (iii)  lower  quality  of 
infrastructure, and (iv) seasonality and high covariance of rural production activities. Financial 
constraints may lead farmers to be highly risk averse and forgo otherwise productive investment 
opportunities.  Externalities  (both  positive  and  negative)  can  also  provide  justification  for 
government intervention through taxes and subsidies, to align social and private returns to 
investments  so  that  markets  result  in  the  socially  optimal  quantities  being  produced  and 
consumed. Examples of positive externalities (and market under-provision) are investments in 
R&D or food safety, while examples of negative externalities are the unsustainable depletion of 
water resources or pollution from the excessive use of fertilizer.  
International experience shows that subsidies for private inputs often lead to disappointing 
results because of the difficulty in designing an efficient subsidy system. If carefully targeted and 
at the appropriate level, in principle, subsidies applied on a temporary basis may correct for     9 
failures in agriculture markets. However, when the subsidy is not temporary, the costs prevail 
over the benefits over time and rolling it back has high political costs and pressures that may 
prevent dismantling, even when governments are aware of their lack of effectiveness. When the 
goal is to pursue social objectives (e.g. consumption smoothing), other instruments, such as 
direct income support, food aid or cash transfers, have a better track record worldwide and are 
often  more  cost-effective.  Subsidies  on  private  inputs  create  disincentives  to  use  scarce 
resources,  such  as  water,  efficiently,  draw  public  funds  away  from  potentially  high  return 
investments, such as R&D, extension, and infrastructure, and may have a high environmental 
cost (World Bank, 2006). Numerous studies show that subsidies are disproportionately captured 
by higher income farmers, so their social impact is often inequitable. Subsidies for agricultural 
inputs may not adversely impact production (unless in cases when over-using such input can 
decrease productivity), but given budget constraints their provision comes at the expense of 
investment for public goods and services with higher returns More so, because their public good 
nature requires government support for their efficient provision. 
Despite this evidence, a number of public expenditure reviews conducted by the World Bank 
show that many governments continue to allocate large shares of their agricultural budgets to 
subsidizing private inputs,  at the level of 37 percent in Argentina (2003), 75 percent in India 
(2002), and 75 percent in Ukraine (2005). The question of what has been the impact of public 
spending  for  agriculture  in  Indonesia  is  explored  in  the  following  section  of  this  paper.    It 
requires  an  empirical  analysis  that  looks  at  the  impact  of  Indonesian  agriculture  spending 
patterns and composition on growth in the sector.  These empirical findings are the focus of this 
analysis. 
 
II. The Impact of Agriculture Public Spending on Growth: An Empirical Analysis for Indonesia 
The objective of this section is to assess whether the volume and the composition of public 
spending are having an impact on growth in the agriculture sector, as identified in the literature 
for other countries.  To that end, we first present recent trends for public agriculture spending in 
relation to  growth,  followed  by  a  time  series  quantitative  assessment  for  Indonesia on  the 
impact of public spending on per capita growth in the agriculture sector during the period 1976-
2006.  
Public spending on agriculture has increased recently in real terms and without a corresponding 
increase in agricultural production. During 2001-08, national spending on agriculture
12 increased 
from Rp 11 trillion to Rp 53 trillion, an average of 11 percent per year in real terms (A nnex III 
provides more detail on spending on agriculture in Indonesia from 2001-08). This was the result 
of large budget increases and a big spending boost from decentralization across all sectors, but 
even greater for agriculture. As Figure 1 illustrates, the agriculture share of the budget doubled 
from 3 percent in 2001 to 6 percent by 2008 and, by that year, reached 1 percent of GDP . The 
bulk of this increase was on agriculture subsidies. This did not result in a corresponding rise in 
agricultural production, which increased an average of 3 percent between 2001 and 2008. 
Spending as a share of agriculture GDP grew from 11 percent to almost 40 percent. In other 
                                                 
12 National spending on agriculture includes central government spending on irrigation, the budget of the Ministry of 
Agriculture, sub-national government spending on agriculture and irrigation, and agricultural subsidies.     10 
words, in 2001 each rupiah spent on agriculture generated almost 9 rupiah compared with only 
2.5 rupiah in 2008. Low agricultural growth combined with a constant share of labor force 
participation in the sector has led to stagnant per-worker value-added. 
Figure 1. Agriculture spending in Indonesia, 2001-08 (%) 
 
Source: World Bank staff calculations.  
Analysis of recent public spending trends in agriculture shows that resources are being directed 
towards  supporting  private  goods  at  the  expense  of  providing  public  goods.    In  2008,  the 
Government directed 50 percent of agriculture resources (Rp 29.4 trillion) towards subsidizing 
private goods, where fertilizer subsidies (Rp 15.2 trillion) accounted for half, and the remainder 
was allocated to: seeds, Raskin,
13 and agriculture credit. As Figure 2 shows, by end -2008 the 
allocation for agriculture subsidies was four times its 2001 level, while resources for irrigation 
have been flat since 2001. The budget of the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) has increased 
significantly since 2001, but has grown at a slower pace than agricultural subsidies. 
   
                                                 
13 Raskin is not a subsidy to agricultural inputs, but primarily an instrument to subsidize rice consumption for the 
poor. To the extent that it increases domestic demand for rice and it is partly used to stabilize prices and therefore 
provide an incentive for increased rice production, it will also have an impact on rice production. In any case, we 
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Figure 2. Index of agricultural spending,  2001-08 (index 2001=100) 
 
Source: World Bank staff calculations. 
Public  investment  in  public  goods  was  largely  behind  Indonesia’s  success  in  increasing 
agricultural productivity through the 1970s and up to the early 1990s.  During the years of the 
Green  Revolution,  Indonesia  invested  heavily  in  its  irrigation  network,  research  and 
development (R&D), extension services, and rural infrastructure, as well as subsidized private 
agricultural inputs (fertilizer, seeds, credit). By the early 1990s, Indonesia had achieved high 
yields  across  several  commodities  including  rice,  cereals  and  potatoes  (World  Bank,  1994). 
Unfortunately, in the 1990s the upward trend in productivity flattened and, exacerbated by 
declining  levels  of  private  and  public  investment,  agriculture  productivity  growth  remains 
sluggish today. (See Annex IV for an illustration of those trends on agricultural GDP and yields 
over the years.)  
Spending as a share of GDP in agriculture averaged 10 percent and 8 percent in the 1970s and 
1980s compared with the 40 percent of today. As discussed earlier, we argue that as a result of 
the composition of such spending, increases in spending, mostly to subsidize private goods, did 
not translate into a proportional increase in growth. This is the motivation for analyzing the 
relationship between public spending and growth in agriculture in Indonesia, focusing on both 
level and composition of public spending. 
What Has Been the Impact of Public Spending on Agriculture in Indonesia?  
To answer this question, we look at the relationship between agriculture public spending and 
the growth rate of agriculture GDP per capita using time series data with both OLS and GMM 
econometric techniques. The model chosen for this paper introduces specific characteristics and 
innovations to fit the Indonesian context as well as the PER broader analysis objectives.
14   
Empirically, the relationship between public spending and growth has been difficult to establish 
in the literature. The relationship between agriculture and non-agriculture GDP is likely to be 
                                                 
14 Different function specification were considered taking into account previous analyses of the impact of public 
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simultaneous rather than unidirectional, which can introduce a simultaneity bias within the 
fiscal variables and the dependent variable (growth rate of agriculture GDP).  To minimize this 
risk, the fiscal variables enter the specification lagged and a more thorough rigorous use of 
instruments is considered by using the General Method of Moments (GMM) technique (see 
Annex II). Estimating the model with the GMM is a way to test the robustness of these empirical 
estimations  by  exploring  the  relationship  within  a  dynamic  setting.  Also,  while  time  series 
analysis would ideally benefit from a longer time span, data availability limited the number of 
observations in the model to a 30-year period.  
The basic model is as follows: 
 
where: 
t is the year  
y is the rate of growth of agriculture GDP per capita 
y2 is the rate of growth of non-agriculture GDP per capita 
Fiscal variables: 
APE is the ratio of total agriculture public expenditures to agriculture GDP  
ATR is a ratio of 3% of total tax revenues to agriculture GDP 
Control variables: 
l is the agriculture labor force (in thousands)  
la is the arable land, as an asset of the farmers (ha) 
GD is an index of global demand for agriculture exports, total world demand for agriculture, 
crops, livestock, primary, and processed exports,  in billions of US$. 
Dummy98 is a dummy, 1 for the 1998 financial crisis 
t   is an error term, 
And b0,,b1,, b2, b3, b4, b5, b6, and b7 are the coefficients assigned to the independent variables. 
Initially, the direct sensitivity of agriculture GDP per capita growth to public spending is tested 
using a functional specification in which the rate of growth of agriculture GDP per capita is the 
dependent variable. Two groups of independent variables are considered: fiscal variables and 
control variables. Regarding the former, the spending effect is initially aggregated into total 
t t t t t t t t Dummy b GD b la b l b ATR b APE b y b b y                    98 ln ln ln 2 ln ln 7 6 5 4 1 3 1 2 1 0    13 
agriculture public spending APE
15 and then broken down into two components: development 
spending on agriculture and irrigation, and fertilizer subsidies. All fiscal variables include central 
government and sub-national spending and are considered as ratios to agriculture GDP.   The 
government budget constraint is considered in the specification function, for methodological 
reasons, by introducing ATR as a proxy for fiscal revenues.
16 This assumes implicitly that, under 
an earmarking hypothesis, there would be no fiscal deficit f or the agriculture sector (period 
average).   
The selection of control variables was made taking into account the factors affecting supply and 
demand of agriculture output in Indonesia. Non-agriculture GDP is used to capture the spillover 
synergies from growth in industry and services. Regarding the supply side, the labor and arable 
land  variables  are  used  as  proxies  for  private  inputs  in  order  to  capture  possible 
complementarity effects between private and public assets. The agriculture demand variable GD 
is an index of global demand for agriculture exports whose fluctuations may have  affected the 
production supply response in Indonesia.  Finally, a time dummy variable
17 is introduced for 
1998 to control for those growth effects related to events in that year, namely the Asian 
financial crisis affecting Indonesia.   
The fiscal variables enter the functional specification with a one-year lag to capture the fact that 
the  agriculture  GDP  growth  rate  (per  capita)  is  dependent  on  the  previous  year’s  public 
spending.  Changes in taxation, for example, may have a particularly lagged effect because they 
affect  the  following  fiscal  year.    In  contrast,  the  control  variables  are  considered 
contemporaneously assuming that they will, most likely, determine the agriculture growth rate 
within the same year period.   
After testing for the stationarity of the series, the variables are estimated in first difference, 
which ensures the stability of the model over time (and corrects for the possibility of unit roots 
and the spurious regression problem in the results). This is an important precondition to meet 
when conducting time series analysis, because the possibility of including a non-stationary series 
can result in picking up a spurious effect. Annex II reports the stationarity tests of all series, and 
shows that all variables considered in this model are stable over time in first difference (see 
Table 3 in the annex).       
Results 
The overall results show that spending on agriculture public goods has an economically and 
statistically  significant  positive  effect  on  the  agriculture  GDP  per  capita  growth  rate,  after 
controlling  for  the  effects  of  non-agriculture  GDP  per  capita  growth  and  for  private  inputs 
(arable land and labor). Table 2 in the Annex presents the results obtained with the OLS and 
                                                 
15 Agriculture public spending is defined as the sum of development spending on irrigation and agriculture plus 
spending on fertilizer subsidies. All data come from the BPS’ publication ‘Indonesia Statistical Yearbook’. 
16 As there is no variable capturing the fiscal revenue burden on the agriculture sector, we use 3 percent of total tax 
revenues based on the fact that agriculture public spending has represented about 3 percent of total public spending 
on average during the period of analysis.   
17 Inclusion of the dummy fortifies the results but it does not change them. It corrects the noise  introduced by the 
economy’s contraction following the Asian financial crisis, GDP declined over 13 percent in 1998 and agriculture by 
1.3 percent. Without the dummy, the relationship between the fiscal variables and per capita agriculture GDP growth 
is similar but significance levels range between 5 and 10 percent.     14 
GMM econometric methods indicating that spending on public goods is a positive driver of the 
growth rate of agriculture GDP per capita, while spending on fertilizer subsidies appears to have 
a  significant  negative  effect.  Not  surprisingly,  the  impact  of  total  agriculture  spending  on 
agriculture GDP per capita growth is unclear, given the opposing direction of the effects from its 
two components: agriculture and irrigation vs. fertilizer subsidies.  The GMM findings show a 
more significant effect than OLS that is in line with international evidence and the literature 
exploring the impact of public spending on growth in the agriculture sector.  
Spending on public goods in the agriculture sector in Indonesia has had a positive impact on 
agricultural growth. This positive effect is associated only with the agriculture and irrigation 
public spending component.  Given the opportunity cost of financing subsidies further at the 
expense of other agriculture spending and irrigation, which directly contribute to growth, the 
Government should consider reallocating spending from fertilizer subsidies to public goods such 
as agriculture extension services, R&D and irrigation, which could  lead to faster sector growth. 
 
III. Trends in Public Spending in the Agricultural Sector 
In an attempt to put these findings into context, this last section analyzes agriculture public 
spending  trends  in  Indonesia  for  the  past  eight  years.  By  analyzing  the  evolution  of  such 
expenditures by program, economic category, and function, the paper explores the prospects 
for further agricultural growth.  
The Budget of the MoA by Program 
The three main programs in the MoA, food security, farmer welfare, and agri-business, are 
loosely  defined  and  their  overlapping  expenditures  makes  monitoring  and  evaluation  at  an 
aggregate (program) level more difficult.  However, two trends are visible in the allocation of the 
budget across programs: (i) both the food security and the farmer welfare programs have seen 
significant budget increases; and (ii) the allocation to the agri-business development program 
has decreased both in real and relative terms.   
Although these trends may be the result of the classification of expenditures rather than actual 
priorities  (e.g.  the  Rural  Agribusiness  Development  or  Pengembangan  Usaha  Agribisnis 
Perdesaan/PUAP  program  under  ‘Farmer  Welfare’  includes  some  activities  that  aim  at 
supporting small agri-business), they reflect the GoI priority towards food security, and the 
specific  goal  of  achieving  self-sufficiency  in  rice.  To  improve  efficiency  in  spending,  where 
outputs and outcomes are attained in the most cost-effective manner, a clear definition of 
program objectives is essential. There should be clarity on the outputs that are expected with a 
budget  allocation.  This  becomes  particularly  relevant  as  the  Government  moves  towards 
performance-based  budgeting,  given  that  clarity  of  outcomes  is  central  in  assessing 
performance.   
       15 
Figure 3. MoA budget by program, 2003-09  (Rp trillion nominal) 
 
Source: MoA. 
The Budget of the MoA by Economic Classification 
Since 2007, the MoA has allocated 40 percent of its budget to “social aid” (Figure 4). Social aid 
has become an umbrella for many projects that transfer resources to farmers through farmers’ 
associations, churches and community groups. Project implementation has improved, avoiding 
cumbersome procurement procedures that often delay project implementation, but it means 
that a large share of the budget is transferred to farmers directly and cannot be used to provide 
public goods (R&D, extension services, marketing assistance) — a responsibility of the public 
sector  that  cannot  be  delegated  to  farmers  or  farmers’  groups.  Although  the  central 
government still provides guidelines for the use of these funds, to a large extent the evaluation 
and allocation of funds to individual activities takes place at the district level, transferring the 
responsibility of allocating funds to the district governments, which often lack the capacity to do 
so effectively.   




                                                 
18 The reduction of personnel expenditures in 2009 is the result of the reclassification of salaries of contractors into 
the “O&M” goods category.       16 
Together, the Secretary General of the Ministry of Agriculture and the Directorate General (DG) 
of Food Crops are responsible for half of the spending classified as “social aid” (Figure 5 and 6).  
About one third of the “social aid” is directed to the PUAP Program (Rp 1 trillion in 2008) under 
the mandate of the Secretary General. Other DGs that allocate a large share of their funds 
through social aid are DG Food Crops, DG Land and Water Management and DG Livestock.  
Figure 5. MoA:  “social aid” planned budget, 2007-09 (Rp billion nominal) 
 
Source: MoA and MoF.  
The MoA by allocating a large share of its budget through “social aid” spending is subsidizing 
private inputs at the expense of providing public goods. A closer look at the social aid spending 
at DG Food Crops shows that most spending was channeled to support seeds and agricultural 
equipment. In 2007, about Rp 1.1 trillion was spent on grants for rice and soya bean producers 
and Rp 394.5 billion in 2008. In the 2009 budget, the grants targeted to seeds and agriculture 
equipment account for Rp 314 billion. Other directorates similarly use “social aid” spending to 
subsidize or provide private inputs such as water pumps, cattle and other goods.  
A  strong  monitoring  and  evaluation  system  is  important  to  assess  the  efficiency  of  these 
projects and overall impact on agricultural productivity and farmer welfare.  The stated benefits 
of quick project implementation, by avoiding cumbersome government procedures are real, but 
as  discussed  in  earlier  sections  of  this  paper  the  impact  of  subsidizing  private  inputs  on 
agricultural  productivity  is  at  best  uncertain.    Thus,  the  increasing  trend  in  the  allocation 
towards this “social aid” category could partly explain the flat productivity, despite increasing 
public spending for the agriculture sector. Understanding which public goods can be provided 
through such a mechanism (and its limitations), as well as the existing market failures that need 
to be addressed, could help improve the design of these projects and their effectiveness (Box 1 
illustrates how effective M&E can help improve the outcomes of an income support program).       17 
 Figure 6. Social aid planned budget, 2008-09 (%) 
   
Source: MoF.      18 
Box 1. Income Support Program PROCAMPO and the power of impact evaluation 
Procampo  is  an  income  support  program  (in  the  form  of  cash  transfers)  launched  by  the  Mexican 
government in 1994 to compensate grain farmers for income losses due to the liberalization brought by 
NAFTA. The program, worth US$1.3 billion in 2005, accounts for over 40 percent of all public spending for 
agriculture and reaches up to 85 percent of the ejidatarios, which are often the poorest farmers in the 
country. Some features of the program have contributed to its evident success: (i) the program, which 
provides eligible farmers a fixed payment per hectare, is decoupled from current production, and the only 
conditionality is to have grown certain crops in the three years prior to 1994 and to continue working the 
land (cropping, livestock, forestry or for environmental purposes); (ii) the subsidy is given to the user of 
the land, not necessarily the owner; (iii) the subsidy is given on a seasonal basis, so farmers that were 
double cropping receive the subsidy twice in a year; (iv) important multiplier effects
19 by providing a 
stable and predictable income source, addressing credit market constraints of many farmers that had land 
but no capital and enabling farmers to invest in riskier and higher yielding investments; and (v) the use of 
the commercial banking syst em to distribute the subsidy has improved access of farmers to financial 
services. 
The same program features that contribute to its success also present challenges: (i) by hectare payments 
means that the largest farmers who may not need the subsidy in the first place are capturing a large share 
of the subsidy;
20 (ii) landless farmers (often the poorest in rural areas) are bypassed by the program; (iii) 
seasonality also means that farmers that were better off (double -cropping, access to irrigation) receive 
today the largest subsidies; and (iv) payments are tied to farmers continuing to work the land, increasing 
the opportunity costs of beneficiaries to diversify away from agriculture into higher value activities.  
The program’s M&E  system, with yearly surveys  of recipients and non-recipients across the  country, 
allows for yearly detailed impact evaluations. These evaluations have shown that the program has been 
successful in supporting farmers’ welfare, accounting for a significant share of the income of the poorest 
farmers.  However,  it  has  not  been  successful  in  diversifying  cropping  patterns.  Only  5  percent  of  all 
beneficiaries  had  switched  crops  after  12  years  of  PROCAMPO.  The  evaluations  have  been  used  to 
improve the program over the years. The coverage of farmers was amended from those who had grown 
grains to other crops to expand the reach to other poor farmers. The regressive nature of the program has 
been widely criticized, which led to paying a higher per-ha subsidy to farmers with farms below 5 ha. To 
maximize the impact of the subsidy on farmers’ credit constraints, the subsidy is paid before the planting 
season. Qualification certificates can be used as collateral with banks, using future payment streams for 
productive investments (although so far a low share of farmers is using it as collateral). 
The success of such a program depends on complementary policies that can maximize multiplier effects, 
such as facilitating access to land and markets. PROCAMPO failed in its objective to help farmers diversify 
and  improve  their  cropping  patterns.  Additional  assistance  might  have  been  needed  to  fulfill  this 
objective, such as technical assistance to access new technologies and market information or access to 
credit programs. Some  conditionality on the use of funds favoring productive investments may have 
increased the results in terms of diversification. Improved targeting (e.g. through cash for work programs) 
to  exclude  the  larger  and  richer  farmers  would  have  addressed  the  criticized  regressiveness  of 
PROCAMPO and increase its efficiency. 
Source: World Bank 2004, Cord and Wodon 2001, GEA 2006, Sadoulet et al 2001.  
                                                 
19 Cord and Wodon 2001 estimate that 1 peso of PROCAMPO translates into 2 pesos for the household. 
20 The 45 percent smallest farmers (with farms below 5 ha) capture only 10 percent of the total subsidy.     19 
The Budget of the MoA by Function 
The  MoA  allocates  a  large  and  increasing  share  of  its  resources  towards  increasing  the 
production of food crops. A significant amount of public resources is invested to increase the 
production of food crops through the DG Food Crops and DG Food Security Agency (Figure 7). In 
addition,  spending  in  other  directorates  (DG  Land and  Water  Management, DG  Agricultural 
Research or the Secretary General) is often guided by the objective to increase productivity of 
food crops, particularly rice. This focus often comes at the expense of other high-value products, 
as the decreasing share in the budget of DG Horticulture (from 6 percent in 2003 to 3 percent in 
2009) or the Quarantine Agency (from 8 percent to less than 5 percent in 2009), which is key for 
exports, illustrate.  
Figure 7. MoA budget by function, 2003-09 (Rp trillion nominal) 
 
Source: MoA, World Bank staff calculations.  
Note: *) budget figure. 
These  allocation  trends  may  have  contributed  to  increasing  rice  production  in  2008.  Rice 
production has increased in the past few years, allowing Indonesia to avoid the pressures that 
many neighbors felt as food prices spiked in 2008. Preliminary analysis suggests that this was 
mostly the result of increasing cropping intensity from existing farmland. While rice yields and 
farmland statistics reflect little changes on previous years, better irrigation management, in 
addition to relatively good weather, allowed rice farmers to increase the number of harvests in 
2008.   
The  focus  on  increasing  production  of  staples  may  hinder  support  for  other  higher-value 
products.  Global  agriculture  trends  and  projections  show  the  demand  for  higher-value 
commodities increasing significantly. Since 2000, the global domestic consumption of meats and 
horticulture in developing countries accelerated considerably. Consequently,  economies with 
this export base profited more than exporters of cereals and other traditional crops, such as rice     20 
(Figure 8).
21 These consumption trends are visible in Indonesia as well. The higher income levels 
have translated into increased demand for higher value commodities, such as fresh fruits and 
vegetables.  Thus, the production value of fresh fruits and vegetables in Indonesia doubled 
between 1994 and 2004 (World Bank, 2007b). Indonesia’s focus on food crops translates into 
limited  support  to  Indonesian  farmers  trying  to  benefit  from  these  new  markets  and 
opportunities.   
In summary, Indonesia’s focus on increasing rice production and achieving rice self-sufficiency 
have resulted in significant production increases in 2007 and 2008, helping Indonesia avoid the 
pressures on other countries in the region that resulted from high food prices. But this focus has 
trade-offs in the long run, as rice is being promoted over other commodities that produce higher 
returns and that are driving the global agriculture markets in other countries. In the previous 
section we looked at the relationship between per capita agriculture GDP growth and several 
determinants.  One  of  the  more  striking  results  was  the  negative  and  significant  relation 
between global demand for agricultural products and per capita agriculture GDP, suggesting 
that Indonesian farmers have not been able to capitalize on the opportunities that global supply 
chains  offer,  and  of  which  many  of  its  peers  in  other  countries  are  already  benefiting.  As 
Indonesia modernizes and income levels increase, a different focus that combines production of 
higher-value agricultural products with ensuring the population has access to food at affordable 
prices may bring higher returns. 
Figure 8. Global agriculture trends, 1985-2000 (index 1980=100) 
 
Source: World Development Report, World Bank, 2008. 
 
IV.  Conclusions 
Spending on agriculture has increased significantly in Indonesia over the past decade. This trend 
reverses the low public investment in the sector visible during the 1990s, which was largely 
                                                 
21 Grain prices (including rice) spiked in 2008 resulting in what many called the ‘Global Food Crisis’. The price of rice, 
maize and other staples grew significantly. Mitchell, 2008, analyzes the causes behind such an increase and he as well 
as a variety of agricultural and forecasting agencies (FAO, IFPRI, USDA) project prices for cereals, rice and other 
staples to stay stable or decline slightly in the short and medium term.     21 
behind the sector’s relatively poor performance. However, a large share of this increase is being 
allocated  to  subsidizing  private  inputs,  which  raises  concerns  over  the  effectiveness  of  this 
spending. 
Using  data  going  back  to  the  1970s,  we  test  empirically  the  impact  of  public  spending  on 
agriculture per capita growth over the past 30 years. Thus, we find a positive and significant 
impact of spending on public goods on per capita agriculture GDP growth, which confirms other 
findings of the literature and the international evidence on agriculture spending. As in other 
countries, we find that both the volume and the composition of spending matter for growth. 
While spending on public goods has a positive and significant impact on agriculture growth, our 
estimation  indicates  that  the  impact  of  subsidizing  fertilizer  on  agriculture  GDP  per  capita 
growth is negative. 
Spending patterns in the MoA show a significant increase of the ‘social aid’ category over the 
past few years, with over 40 percent of all spending in the 2009 budget classified under this 
category. This type of spending allows the MoA to avoid cumbersome government procedures 
to implement projects and reach farmers quickly.  However, it also means that a large share of 
the budget is primarily financing private inputs at the expense of providing public goods and 
services, which should be the main responsibility of the MoA. 
Going forward, it is important to allocate resources according to a strategy that maximizes 
spending effectiveness and that can translate into increasing growth for the agriculture sector, 
while paying attention to the welfare of farmers. Some suggestions, derived from our analysis, 
to improve public spending on agriculture in Indonesia, are as follows: 
  Reallocating public spending from subsidizing private inputs (fertilizer, seeds, and grants to 
farmers and farmers’ groups) towards providing agriculture and irrigation public goods and 
services. 
  Reorienting government support to help small farmers and farmers’ groups to gain access to 
global value chains and to meet the domestic demand for higher value-added products. This 
would entail a shift in the current support that prioritizes food or estate crops (the focus of 
the current agricultural policy). 
  Continuing the government’s income support to small and poor farmers, but also providing 
incentives for them to pursue productive investments. Indonesia has extensive experience 
in  the  area  of  cash  transfers,  which  could  be  useful  for  this  purpose.  Conditional  cash 
transfers, providing incentives to put these cash transfers to productive use, may result in 
increased investment and productivity in the agricultural sector. Also, careful targeting will 
be key to ensure the efficiency of the program as well as its fiscal viability. 
  Putting in place a comprehensive M&E system that allows the GoI to evaluate the impact of 
its transfer programs.  Such a system would be instrumental to prevent/correct mistakes in 
program design and maximize effectiveness in bringing about the necessary increases in 
agriculture productivity, as well as alleviating poverty in rural areas.     22 
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Annex I: Empirical Estimation and Methodology 
Annex Table 1.  Data 
   Variable  Source: 
y  Agriculture GDP per capita  FAOSTAT 
  Fertilizer subsidies  Statistical Yearbook of Indonesia 1980-2008, Presidential 
Address to the Republic of Indonesia 1793, 1978, 1983, 
and LKPP 2004-2008 
  Agriculture and irrigation 
spending 
Statistical Yearbook of Indonesia 1980-2008, Presidential 
Address to the Republic of Indonesia 1793, 1978, 1983, 
and LKPP 2004-2008 
ATR  Tax revenues to agriculture 
GDP 
Statistical Yearbook of Indonesia 1980-2008, Presidential 
Address to the Republic of Indonesia 1793, 1978, 1983, 
and LKPP 2004-2008 
APE  Total agriculture public 
expenditures to agriculture 
GDP 
Statistical Yearbook of Indonesia 1980-2008, Presidential 
Address to the Republic of Indonesia 1793, 1978, 1983, 
and LKPP 2004-2008 
l  Agriculture labor force  Statistical Yearbook of Indonesia 
la  Arable land  FAOSTAT 
GD  Index of global demand for 
agriculture exports 
FAOSTAT 
  Population  World Bank WDI, 2008 
 
The basic model is as follows: 
 
where: 
t is the year  
y is the rate of growth of agriculture GDP per capita 
Fiscal variables: 
APE is the ratio of total agriculture public expenditures to agriculture GDP  
ATR is a ratio of 3% of total tax revenues to agriculture GDP 
Control variables: 
y2 is the rate of growth of non-agriculture GDP per capita 
l is the agriculture labor force (in thousands)  
la is the arable land, as an asset of the farmers (ha) 
t t t t t t t t Dummy b GD b la b l b ATR b APE b y b b y                    98 ln ln ln 2 ln ln 7 6 5 4 1 3 1 2 1 0    27 
GD is an index of global demand for agriculture exports, total world demand for agriculture, 
crops, livestock, primary, and processed exports,  in billions of US$. 
Dummy98 is a dummy, 1 for the 1998 financial crisis 
t   is an error term, 
And b0,,b1,, b2, b3, b4, b5, b6, and b7 are the coefficients assigned to the independent variables.  
Estimation 
 
The model was estimated with time series data for 1976-06 in first difference using OLS and a 
one-year  lag of  the  fiscal  variables.   This  is  because  fiscal variables  impact agriculture  GDP 
growth with a lag, as today’s output is dependant on last year’s net public spending.  However, 
the control variables enter the specification contemporaneously, reflecting the assumption that 
their impact occurs within the same fiscal year. All variables enter the specification in first 
difference ensuring that they are stationary and that the model is stable overtime.  As can be 
seen  from  the  Augmented  Dickey  Fuller  tests  for  stationarity  (Table  3  below),  the  control 
variables where non-stationary in levels as well as the log of non-agriculture GDP, but all were 
stationary in first differences.  On the other hand, the fiscal variables and the log of agriculture 
GDP per capita are stationarity in both levels and first difference. 
 
Annex Table 2.  Impact of Agriculture Public Spending on Per Capita Agriculture Growth 
Dependent Variable: Agriculture GDP Growth OLS(1) OLS(2) OLS(3) GMM(1) GMM(2) GMM(3)
Constant -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.01 -0.06 -0.06
(-1.64) (-1.21) (-1.97)+ (-0.38) (-2.43)* (-2.87)**
D(APE (-1)) 0.46 5.90
(0.56) (2.29)*
D(Agriculture and Irrigation Public Spending(-1)) 2.36 2.72 8.20 4.68
(2.17)* (2.41)* (-3.07)** (2.90)**
D(Fertilizer Subsidies Spending(-1)) -5.14 -6.38 -33.31 -15.62
(-1.83)+ (-2.24)* (-4.41)** (-3.92)**
D(Log non agri-GDP per capita, US Dollar) 0.89 0.84 0.93 0.15 0.97 0.83
(6.04)** (7.52)** (12.28)** (0.51) 4.31 (6.10)**
D(Log Agriculture Labor) 0.79 0.52 0.30 3.52 -0.03 -1.62
(2.44)* (1.34) (0.72) (2.23)* (-0.05) (-2.61)*
D(Log Arable Land) -0.37 -0.0005 -0.16 -1.88 0.99 0.82
(-0.61) 0.000 (-0.30) (-2.05)+ (1.30) (1.56)
D(ATR (-1)) -6.65 -24.93
(-1.43) (-3.53)**
D(Log GD) 0.0000 -0.0002
(-1.25) (-3.22)**
Dummy98 -0.19 -0.19 -1.46 0.36
(-1.18) (-1.23) (-3.11)** (0.89)
Observations 29 29 29 27 27 27
R-squared 0.89 0.92 0.90 0.38 0.59 0.79
Durbin Watson Stat. 2.41 2.60 2.80 1.47 2.57 2.22
 Source: WB Staff estimates.  
Note: The estimations corrected for heteroskedasticity using robust standard errors.     28 
Annex Table 3.  Augmented Dickey Fuller Tests and Stationarity 
Interpolated Dickey -Fuller Test  
Critical Value: 1% =  -3.716; 5% =  -2.986; 10% = 2.624  
Variable   Test Statistic 
variable in 




variable in first 
difference Z(t)  
Unit Root 
Process  
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Tota l Agriculture Public Spending (t -1)  -3.391   I(0)  -8.082   I(0) 
Agriculture and Irrigation Public Spending to Agriculture GDP 
(t-1)  -3.482   I(0)  -7.623   I(0) 
Fertilizer Subsidy Spending to Agriculture GDP (t -1))  -2.667   I(0)  -8.458   I(0) 
Growth of Agriculture G DP per Capita (US Dollar, log)   -3.380   I(0)  -7.008   I(0) 
Growth of Non Agriculture GDP per Capita (US Dollar, log)   -1.519   I(1)  -6.361   I(0) 
Arable Land (log)   -0.404   I(1)  -3.674   I(0) 
Labor force in the agriculture sector (log)   -1.788   I(1)  -5.725   I(0) 
Agriculture private machinery input (log)   0.130   I(1)  -3.515   I(0) 
Agriculture tax revenue (log)   -0.158   I(1)  -5.082   I(0) 
Index of global demand for agriculture export (log)   -1.899   I(1)  -3.592   I(0) 
 
Source: WB Staff estimates.     29 
Annex II.  Robustness:  Estimating with the General Method of Moments (GMM) 
We look at the impact of public spending on agriculture growth with the GMM to conclude that 
the results are not dependant on the choice of model specification (hence, as reported in Table 
2 in the annex GMM(1), (2), and (3)) .  Our findings are generally consistent across specifications 
and changes to the econometric technique, and in line with the findings from the literature 
exploring the impact of public spending on growth. However, there are some interesting points 
to highlight from these empirical estimations.  
To control for possible endogeneity between the public spending components and other right 
hand side variables, the (GMM) regression technique includes instrumental variables that are 
the lagged values of the regressors, it creates a dynamic setting that can capture endogeneity.
 22 
Thus,  it  uses  as  instruments  the  second  and  third  lags  of  Agriculture  and  Irrigation  Public 
Spending, Fertilizer Subsidy Spending, ATR and residuals, as well as the first and second lags of 
growth rate GD, non agriculture GDP per capita, and the first and second lags of Arable land, 
and Labor force in the agriculture sector.  
The results indicate that most fiscal variables have a statistically significant effect on the growth 
rate of agriculture GDP per capita, while the impact is more statistically significant within the 
GMM setting. Thus, the positive and statistically significant effect on the agri-GDP per capita 
growth  rate  comes  from  agriculture  and  irrigation  spending.    This  can  be  seen  across  the 
estimations in Table 2, but OLS(3) and GMM(3) are particularly interesting, for they capture the 
composition  effect  while  considering  the  impact  of  taxation  and  the  global  demand  for 
agriculture.  By contrast, fertilizer subsidy spending has a negative effect on the growth rate of 
agriculture GDP per capita like in the OLS results.  
As in OLS, the growth rate of non agriculture GDP has a positive and highly significant impact 
implying that spillovers effects from the other sectors are complementary and contribute to 
growth. With the exception of GMM(1), the effect from the time dummy variable for 1998 is not 
significant and negative, but serves to control for any disturbances to growth that could be 
attributed to economy’s contraction following the Asian financial crisis.   
There are also some differences between the OLS and GMM results worth mentioning. Total 
agriculture spending (combining development spending and subsidies) is only significant in the 
GMM setting. The agricultural tax variable is negatively associated using OLS and it becomes 
statistically significant in the dynamic setting of the GMM technique (GMM(3)).  Also, the impact 
from the change in world demand for agricultural products is negative and significant in the 
GMM results, suggesting a lack of response of agriculture production in Indonesia to changes in 
global demand.   
 
 
                                                 
22 Durbin Wu Hausman test is used to determine endogeneity problem. The test result is rejecting the null hypothesis 
that the “regressors are exogenous”.     30 
Annex III.  Public Expenditure on Agriculture 
Annex Table 4. Agriculture Public Expenditure (Rp billion) 
Item  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
1. Agriculture:  3,619  4,851  6,258  5,590  6,228  10,678  13,835  16,001 
   - Central  1,227  1,922  3,091  2,537  2,661  5,618  6,385  8,091 
   - Sub national  2,393  2,930  3,167  3,053  3,567  5,060  7,450  7,909 
2. Irrigation:  4,785  3,866  5,765  4,641  4,418  6,819  6,822  8,213 
   - Central  3,971  2,815  4,595  3,602  3,355  5,311  4,232  5,463 
   - Sub national  813  1,051  1,170  1,038  1,063  1,508  2,590  2,750 
3. Subsidies  3,518  4,742  6,085  6,175  9,071  8,651  13,371  29,398 
                 
Total Agriculture Spending  11,922  13,460  18,108  16,405  19,716  26,148  34,028  53,611 
National Agriculture Spending 
as % of National Spending 
3%  4%  4%  4%  4%  4%  4%  5% 
National Agriculture Spending 
as % of GDP 
1%  1%  1%  1%  1%  1%  1%  1% 
Central Agriculture Spending 
as % of Agriculture GDP 
5%  5%  7%  6%  8%  10%  11%  19% 
Sub National Agriculture 
Spending as % of Agri-GDP 
2%  2%  2%  2%  2%  3%  5%  5% 
National Agriculture Spending 
as % of Agriculture GDP 
7%  7%  10%  8%  10%  13%  16%  24% 
Source: World Bank staff calculations based on data from MoF and MoA. 
 
Annex Table 5. Agriculture Public Expenditure (% of Total Agriculture Spending) 
Item  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
                 
Agriculture  30%  36%  35%  34%  32%  41%  41%  30% 
   - Central  10%  14%  17%  15%  13%  21%  19%  15% 
   - Sub national  20%  22%  17%  19%  18%  19%  22%  15% 
Irrigation   40%  29%  32%  28%  22%  26%  20%  15% 
   - Central  33%  21%  25%  22%  17%  20%  12%  10% 
   - Sub national  7%  8%  6%  6%  5%  6%  8%  5% 
Subsidies  30%  35%  34%  38%  46%  33%  39%  55% 
Source: World Bank staff calculations based on data from MoF and MoA. 
 
Note:  
1.  Agriculture Spending consists of spending on sub-sector: (1) Food crops, (2) Estate/horticulture crops, and (3) Livestock. 
2.  Agricultural Spending at Central Level comprises of spending on sector: (1) Agriculture, (2) Irrigation, and (3) Agricultural 
Subsidy. 
3.  Agricultural Spending at Sub National Level comprises of spending on sector: (1) Agriculture and (2) Irrigation. 
4.  Agricultural Spending at Central Level, source: Audited Financial Report of  MoA, 2005-07, and 2008 Plan Budget. 
5.  Nominal GDP including oil and gas. 
Notes on Budget Classification: 
Economic classification:  The classification changed in 2003 and 2005 and the new format is 
considerably  different.  Currently,  the  budget  is  broken  down  into:  personnel  expenses, 
operations and maintenance costs, travel expenses, and subsidies.  However, it can be tracked 
to the pre-2005 classification to see the breakdown by routine (recurrent) and by development 
(capital)  expenditures.  At  the  provincial  and  district  level,  development  expenditures  are 
classified into: sector, subsector, and functional classification only.  The data by routine consists 
of: personnel expenses, recurrent materials and good costs, subsidies, and miscellaneous. It can 
be  disaggregated  by  sector  or  sub  sector  and  by  project/program  and  department/unit     31 
level/executing  agencies.  Yet,  APBD  data  lacks  detail  on  projects  or  programs  attributed  to 
individual provinces or district governments. 
Functional classification: Currently, the budget consists of 11 functions, by which the 
agriculture sub-function is clustered under the “economy” function.  In this sense, the 
development expenditures are organized by bidang (21 sections) and dinas (executing 
agency),  while  the  routine  spending  was  aggregated  into  apparatus  and  public 
expenditure.     32 
Annex IV. Indonesian Agriculture At A Glance 
Annex Figure 1. Yield Increases in Indonesia 1975-2007 
 
Source: FAO and World Bank staff estimates. 
 
Annex Figure 2.  Comparison average growth rates by sector in Indonesia, 1990-2008 
 
Source: FAO and World Bank staff estimates. 
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Annex Figure 3. Comparison Rice Yields Growth in Asia 
 
 
Source: FAO and World Bank staff calculations. 
 
Annex Figure 4. Comparison Maize Yields Growth in Asia 
 
 
Source: FAO and World Bank staff calculations.  
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